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CASENOTES 
IN RE AMERICAN WASTE: A CLUMSY EXPANSION OF THE 
RIGHT TO LITIGATE ENVIRONMENT AL ISSUES 
In November 1987, American Waste and Pollution Control 
Company (American Waste) submitted to the Louisiana Depart­
ment of Environmental Quality (DEQ)1 a permit application2 for a 
solid waste3 landfill.• The proposed facility, Cade IP, would have 
served a tri-parish area, replacing another landfill that was sched­
uled for closing. 6 Man y  local citizens opposed Cade II, alleging that 
I. DEQ is "the primary agency in the state concerned with environmental protection." 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:201 l(A)(l) (West Supp. 1995). The department has the power to 
grant or deny environmental permits. Id. § 30:2011(0)(2). 
2. Louisiana environmental regulations prohibit new solid waste landfills from being 
constructed or operated without a permit. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 33, § VII.315.E (1994). 
3. Solid waste includes garbage and other discarded materials, but does not include 
such items as sewage, special nuclear material, or hazardous waste. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 30:2153(1)(a) (West Supp. 1995). Typically , the composition of solid waste is: 35.6% pa­
per; 20.1 % yard waste; 9% rubber, leather, textiles, and wood; 8.9% food waste; 8.9% met­
als; 8.4% glass; 7.3% plastics; and 1.8% miscellaneous inorganic wastes. Gerald L. Walter, 
Jr., Solid Waste Management, in LOUISIANA ENVIRONMENTAL HANDBOOK, 8-1, 8-2 (Roger 
Stetter et al. eds., 1994). 
4. In re American Waste & Pollution Control Co., 642 So. 2d 1258, 1260 (La. 1994). 
Under Louisiana law, "'Sanitary landfill' means a controlled area of land upon which non­
hazardous solid waste is deposited in such a manner that protects the environment with no 
on-site burning of wastes, and so located, contoured, and drained that it will not constitute 
a source of water pollution." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2153(7) (West 1989). 
5. The proposed facility was to be located near Cade, Louisiana. Cade I was a prior 
proposal for a solid waste landfill, for which American Waste was denied a construction 
permit. American Waste, 642 So. 2d at 1260. 
6. In re American Waste & Pollution Control Co., 581 So. 2d 738, 742-43 app. (La. 
App. 1st Cir. 1991), cited in American Waste, 642 So. 2d at 1261. During much of the 1980s, 
the New Iberia Landfill served the Parishes of Iberia, St. Martin, and Lafayette, exclusive of 
the City of Lafayette. American Waste, 581 So. 2d at 742 app. How(·, er, DEQ set a closing 
date of April 30, 1990 for the New Iberia Landfill. Id. at 742-43 app. The scheduled closing 
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the landfill would threaten the Chicot Aquifer, a major source of 
drinking water for southwest Louisiana. 7 
Over the next few years, DEQ evaluated the permit applica­
tion and held two public hearings on the Cade II proposal.8 After 
DEQ completed its file, all DEQ department heads reported that 
they had no technical objections to granting the permit.9 On Janu­
ary 9, 1992, Judge Redmann, as DEQ Secretary pro tempore,10 
granted American Waste a permit to construct and operate the 
proposed Cade II facility.11 War on Waste12 and the Acadiana 
Chapter of the National Audubon Society (collectively, "WOW"), 
filed an appeal to the First Circuit Court of Appeal.13 
For legal standing, WOW relied on Louisiana Revised Statute 
section 30:2024(C),14 which provides that "[a]ny person aggrieved 
by a final decision or order of the [DEQ] may appeal therefrom to 
the Court of Appeal, First Circuit .. . "1� American Waste filed a 
motion to dismiss the appeal,16 arguing that WOW had no right to 
appeal under section 30:2024(C) because the grant of the Cade II 
permit was not a "decision or order" as those terms are defined by 
the Administrative Procedures Act17 (APA).18 Under the APA's 
prompted local authorities to negotiate with American Waste for construction of a replace­
ment landfill. Id. at 743 app. 
7. American Waste, 642 So. 2d at 1260. 
8. Id. at 1260-61. Acting within its statutory discretion, id. at 1265, DEQ did not hold 
any adjudicative hearings. Id. at 1264. The public hearings were required by DEQ rules. 
Rules of Procedure, Louisiana Environmental Control Commission, Rule 5.l(B). 
9. American Waste, 581 So. 2d at 743. 
10. American Waste, 642 So. 2d at 1261. Then Secretary Templet was recused on mo­
tion by American Waste. American Waste, 581 So. 2d at 740. This recusal was upheld by 
the First Circuit. Id. at 742. 
11. American Waste, 642 So. 2d at 1261. 
12. War on Waste is a nonprofit, unincorporated association. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 1263. 
15. Id.; see LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:2024(C) (West 1989). 
16. American Waste, 642 So. 2d at 1261. 
17. Louisiana's APA is contained in Title 49 of the Revised Statutes. See LA. REV. 
STAT. AN.N. § 49:950 et. seq. (West 1989 and Supp. 1995). The Louisiana APA was originally enacted m 1966 and became effective in 1967. Robert Force & Lawrence Griffith The Loui­
si
.
ana Administrative Procedure Act, 42 LA. L. REv. 1227, 1227 n.1 ( 1982). Th� APA pro­
vides general procedural rules for administrative agencies. American Waste, 642 So. 2d at 
1264. Because the APA definition of "agency" includes any department that has authority 
to make regulations, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:951(2) (West 1989) the DEQ meets the APA 
�efinition of "ag�ncy." See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:20ll(D)(l) (West 1989) (statute grant­
mg DEQ authority to make regulations). 
18. A.merican Waste, 642 So. 2d at 1263. At one point, the supreme court suggested that American Waste based its appeal on an assertion that WOW was not an aggrieved 
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definitions, an agency action is a "decision or order" only if a hear­
ing is required by "constitution or statute."19 
The First Circu it determined that WOW did have a right to 
appeal under 30:2024(C).20 The court reasoned that by alleging a 
threat to drinking water, WOW was asserting a property right for 
which due process required a hearing.21 Concluding that a hearing 
was required by "constitution or statute," the court held that the 
DEQ action was a "decision or order" as defined by the APA and 
therefore WOW had standing to appeal under 30:2024(C).22 On the 
merits, the First C ircuit vacated the order granting the permit and 
remanded the application to DEQ for further proceedings. 23 
On application by American Waste, 24 the Louisiana Supreme 
Court granted writs to review the matter. 211 In a five to two deci­
s ion, 26 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the APA definition 
of "decision or order" does not apply to Louisiana Revised Statute 
30:2024(C) and that DEQ's grant of the solid waste landfill permit 
was a "decision or order" appealable under 30:2024(C).27 In re 
party. Id. at 1261. Actually, American Waste's primary argument supporting dismissal was 
that the DEQ action was not a "decision or order." See id. at 1263-64. This is made clear by 
the legal analysis in the noted case, id. at 1263-64, as well as the discussion of standing in 
the First Circuit's opinion, Jn re American Waste & Pollution Control Co., 633 So. 2d 188, 
189-90 n.2 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993), aff'd on other grounds, 642 So. 2d at 1258 (La. 1994). In 
a ddition, American Waste argued that the case should be dismissed because WOW had not 
exhausted its administrative remedies, Brief for Applicant at 10-11, American Waste, 642 
So. 2d at 1258, and because the permit appeal was not a civil matter constitutionally within 
the appellate court's su bject matter jurisdiction. American Waste, 642 So. 2d at 1266. 
19. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:951(3) (West 1987). 
20. American Waste, 633 So. 2d at 189-90 and n.2. 
21. Id. at 190 n.2. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 197. The First Circuit concluded that DEQ did not establish for the record 
that it had properly evaluated alternative sites and balanced the benefits and risks of the 
proposed landfill. Id. at 194-95. 
24. See Brief for Applicant at 10-11, American Waste, 642 So. 2d 1258 (La. 1994). 
25. American Waste, 642 So. 2d at 1261. 
26. Justice Watson wrote for the court. Id. at 1260. Justices Marcus and Kimball dis­
s e nted and assigned reasons. Id. at 1266. Justice Shortess, sitting pro tempore for Justice 
Dennis, was not on the panel. Id. at 1260 n.l. 
27. Id. at 1265. In addition to interpreting 30:2024(C), the court explicitly rejected 
American Waste's contention that the appellate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 
hear an appeal from the DEQ. Id. at 1266. The court did not discuss American Waste's 
argument that WOW lacked standing for failure to exhaust its administrative remedies, see 
supra note 18, but by upholding WOW's standing the court implicitly rejected that argu­
ment. The supreme court noted that the appropriate standard of review gives deference to 
DEQ determinations, id. at 1265, but nonetheless affirmed the First Circuit's ruling vacating 
DEQ's grant of the Cade II permit and remanding the matter to DEQ. Id. at 1266. 
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American Waste and Pollution Control Co., 642 So. 2d 1258, 1265 
(La. 1994). 
The Louisiana Constitution of 1974 mandates that "the envi­
ronment shall be protected,28 conserved, and replenished insofar as 
possible and consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the 
people."29 Although some delegates to the 1973 Constitutional 
Convention proposed giving private citizens a constitutional right 
to bring suit on environmental matters, the convention rejected 
those proposals and kept environmental protection within the 
province of the legislature. so 
In 1983,31 acting pursuant to its constitutional mandate, the 
legislature created the Department of Environmental Quality.32 
The legislature made the DEQ the "primary agency" with respon­
sibility for protecting the environment33 and gave the DEQ the 
power to adopt environmental regulations34 and to grant or deny 
28. Prior to 1921, the Louisiana Constitution did not expressly authorize governmental 
action to protect the environment. Charles S. McCowan, Jr., The Evolution of Environmen­
tal Law in Louisiana, 52 LA. L. REV. 907 (1992). However, the Civil Code authorized local 
regulation of smoke and odors, id. n.2, and Louisiana courts would sometimes grant to gov­
ernment, id. at 908, or private individuals, id. at 909, injunctive relief from environmental 
nuisances. 
In contrast to earlier constitutions, the Constitution of 1921 explicitly provided for en­
vironmental protection, directing the legislature to conserve the "natural resources" of the 
state. LA. CONST. OF 1921, art. VI, § 1. Still, Louisiana had few controls on wastes until the 
mid-1970's. Roger Stetter, et al., Environmental Law Fundamentals, in LOUISIANA ENVIRON­
MENTAL HANDBOOK, 2-1, 2-4 (Roger Stetter, et al., eds. 1994). 
29. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1. The constitutional mandate to protect the environment 
was interpreted in a 1984 landmark decision, Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Envtl. Con­
trol Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984), cited in American Waste, 642 So. 2d at 1262. Save 
Ourselves determined that the constitutional standard does not establish environmental 
protection as an exclusive goal, but that it does require environmental costs to be balanced 
against economic, social, and other factors. Save Ourselves, 452 So. 2d at 1157. The case is 
also known as the "IT decision," see, e.g., American Waste, 633 So. 2d at 193 n.4, because 
the case involved IT corporation. Save Ourselves, 452 So. 2d at 115'1. The case established a 
governmental responsibility toward the environment that has become known as the "public 
trust doctrine." McCowan, supra note 28, at 918. 
30. In re American Waste & Pollution Control Co., 588 So. 2d 367, 372 (La. 1991), 
cited in American Waste, 642 So. 2d at 1262. 
31. In 1983, legislators introduced more bills dealing with environmental matters than 
in any previous year. Charles S. McCowan, Jr. & Maureen N. Harbourt, Update of Louisi­
ana Enuironmental Laws and Regulations, 31 LA. BAR J. 168, 172 (1983). 
32. DEQ became the successor to the Office of Environmental Affairs, an agency which 
had been located within the Department of Natural Resources. McCowan, supra note 28, at 
913-15. 
33. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2011(A)(l) (West Supp. 1995). 
34. Id. § 30:2011(0)(1) (West 1989). 
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permits. 3 6  The DEQ was given significant discretion, including the 
authority to issue solid waste landfill permits without the necessity 
of an adjudicatory hearing.3 6  However, the department's discretion 
is not unlimited. 37 The Louisiana Environmental Quality Act38 
(LEQA) provides both substantive39 and procedural guidelines.'0 
Procedural provisions include the LEQA requirements that DEQ 
give notice and a hearing before assessing civil penalties,0 before 
modifying a permit for cause, 4 2 and within fifteen days of issuing 
an emergency cease and desist order.'3 The LEQA also provides for 
appeals:" 
Section 30:2024(C) provides that "[a]ny person aggrieved"� by 
a final 4 6 decision or order of the [DEQ] may appeal therefrom to 
the Court of Appeal, First Circuit . . . . "'7 Because the right to 
appeal depends upon the existence of a "final decision or order," 
the meaning of that phrase becomes important.0 However, Section 
30:2024(C) does not define the term, and, in interpreting the right 
to appeal, the First Circuit produced two inconsistent lines of 
cases. 4 9 
35. Id. § 30:20ll(D) (2)  (West Supp. 1995). 
36. American Waste, 642 So. 2d at 1265. 
37. See infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text. 
38. Title 30, Subtitle II of the Louisiana Revised Statutes (§ 30:2001 et. seq.) is known 
as the Louisiana Environmental Quality Act. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 30:2001 (West 1989). 
39. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2156 (West 1989) (limiting liability of landown­
ers for removal of solid wastes). 
40. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2019(A) (West 1989) (providing that adoption, 
amendment, or repeal of rules shall be in accordance with the AP A). 
41. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2025(E)(4) (West 1989). 
42. Id. § 30:2023(B)(2) (West Supp. 1995). 
43. Id. § 30:2025(C) (l) (West 1989). Also, due process would require a hearing if a 
person has a property or liberty interest at stake. Delta Bank & Trust Co. v. Lassiter, 383 
So. 2d 330, 334 (La. 1980), cited in American Waste, 642 So. 2d at 1263. 
44. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:2024(C) (West 1989). 
45. A person is aggrieved if he has a real and actual interest that is adversely affected 
by a DEQ action. In re BASF Corp. Chem. Div., 533 So. 2d 971, 973 (La. App. 1st Cir. 
1988); see also LA. CODE C1v. PROC. ANN. art. 681 (West 1960). 
46. A "final judgment" is a judgment that determines the merits of a controversy. LA. 
ConE C1v. PRoc. ANN. art. 184 1 (West 1990). In In re Marine Shale Processors, Inc., the issue 
was whether a DEQ action was final. 563 So. 2d 278, 281-82 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990), cited in 
American Waste, 642 So. 2d at 1263. The court cited Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure 
article 1841, id. at 281, and also noted that federal courts have determined finality o f  agency 
action based in part on whether judicial review would disrupt the "orderly process of adjudi­
cation." Id. at 282. 
47. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:2024(C) (West 1989). 
48. See infra notes 49-95 and accompanying text. 
49. American Waste, 642 So. 2d at 1263. 
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One line of cases was headed by In re Carline Tank Services, 
Inc.60 In Carline, the First Circuit determined that the APA's defi­
nition of "decision or order"&l applies to 30:2024(C).62 The court 
relied on the AP A's stipulation that the Act applies to  all agencies 
unless expressly excepted by legislation68 and that no statute ei­
ther supplies an alternative definition of "decision or  order" or ex­
cludes the AP A's definition of "decision or order" from applying to 
Louisiana Revised Statute Section 30:2024(C).6' 
For additional support of its conclusion that the APA defini­
tions apply to section 30:2024(C), the Carline court cited the Save 
Ourselves decision.66 In Save Ourselves, the meaning of "decision 
or order" was not an issue, but the supreme court did discuss ap­
peals of DEQ decisions.66 The supreme court noted that 30:2024(C) 
excludes the application of two sections67 of the AP A that direct 
appeals to the district court and instead section 30:2024(C) pro­
vides that DEQ decisions are to be appealed to the First Circuit.68 
The supreme court concluded that the altered venue for appeals 
was the only reason that application of the two AP A sections was 
excluded.69 From that supreme court explanation, the First Circuit 
inferred that other provisions of the APA would apply,60 including 
the APA definitions found in section 49:951, a section whose appli­
cation was not expressly excluded, section 49:951.61 Section 
49:951(3) states that "'[d]ecision' or 'order' means the whole or 
any part of the final disposition . . . of any agency, in any matter 
other than rulernaking, required by constitution or statute to be 
50. In re Carline Tank Serv., Inc., 626 So. 2d 358 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993), cited in 
American Waste, 642 So. 2d at 1263. 
51. See infra note 63 and accompanying text. 
52. Carline, 626 So. 2d at 362-63. See also In re Carline Tank Serv., Inc., 627 So. 2d 
669, 669-70 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993) (denying rehearing and explaining the original holding 
in more detail), cited in American Waste, 642 So. 2d at 1263. 
53. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:966(B) (West 1987); Carline, 626 So. 2d at 362. 
54. Carline, 626 So. 2d at 362-63. Commentators have also interpreted the APA as 
having a broad coverage, stating for example that all state agencies "which promulgate rules 
or make decisions ... are subject to the [APA] unless they are part of the legislature, the 
judiciary, . .. or unless expressly exempted from the [APA]." Robert Force & Lawrence 
Griffith, The Louisiana Adm inistrative Procedure Act, 42 LA. L. REV. 1227, 1231 (1982). 
55. Carline, 626 So. 2d at 363 n.7. 
56. Save Ourselves, 452 So. 2d at 1158. 
57. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:962 and 49:964 (West 1989 and Supp. 1995). 
58. Save Ourselves, 452 So. 2d at 1 158; see LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:2024(C) (West 
1989). 
59. Save Ourselves, 452 So. 2d at 1158. 
60. Carline, 626 So. 2d at 363 n.7. 
61. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:951 (West 1987 and Supp. 1995). 
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determined on the record after notice and opportunity for an 
agency hearing .... "62 Thus, if section 49:951(3) applies to sec­
tion 30:2024(C), then the right to appeal DEQ actions depends 
upon the existence of some statutory or constitutional requirement 
for a hearing.68 That reasoning was applied in Carline.64 
In Carline, the DEQ granted an air emissions permit for a 
barge cleaning operation. 65 A competitor 66 of the company that re­
ceived the permit appealed the DEQ action, claiming standing 
under 30:2024(C).67 The court, however, noted that no statutory or 
constitutional provision mandates a hearing before an air permit is 
granted.68 Further, the court determined that the competitor was 
not asserting a property or liberty interest such that due process 
required a hearing for the specific case. 69 Thus, no hearing was re­
quired at all.70 The First Circuit held that because a hearing was 
not required, the DEQ action was not a decision or order, and the 
competitor could not appeal under 30:2024(C).71 
In In re Industrial Pipe, the First Circuit applied the Carline 
reasoning in dismissing an environmental group's appeal of a DEQ 
action granting a solid waste permit. 72 The Carline reasoning was 
applied yet again by the First Circuit in American Waste.73 
Thus, under Carline and its progeny, an aggrieved party could 
appeal a DEQ action to the First Circuit when a statute or consti­
tutional provision created a general requirement for an adjudica­
tive hearing or when due process required a hearing.74 However, 
when an initial hearing was not required, section 30:2024(C) could 
not be used to bring an appeal. 75
62. Id. § 49:951(3) (West 1987). 
63. See supra note 5 1  and accompanying text; see also supra note 47 and accompany-
ing text. 
64. Carline, 626 So. 2d at 363. 
65. Id. at 359. 
66. Id. at 363. 
67. Id. The competitor alleged that DEQ made several errors, including a failure to 
follow its own rules. Id. at 359-60. 
68. Carline, 626 So. 2d at 363. 
69. Id. at 363-64. 
70. Id. at 363. 
71. Id. 
72. In re Industrial Pipe, Inc., 626 So. 2d 364 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993), cited in Ameri­
can Waste, 642 So. 2d at 1263. 
73. American Waste, 633 So. 2d at 189-90 n.2. However, the court determined that 
WOW could appeal because due process required a hearing. Id. 
74. Carline, 626 So. 2d at 363-64. 
75. Id. 
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The other line of cases was headed by In re Marine Shale 
Processors, Inc.,76 which was decided before Carline.77 Marine 
Shale held that the DEQ's denial of a permit variance was a "final 
order or decision" appealable under 30:2024(C),78 even though no 
statute or constitutional provision requires a hearing before a re­
quested permit variance is denied.79 However, the court only ad­
dressed whether the DEQ action was "final."80 Apparently, the 
parties did not question the meaning of "decision or order."81 
Thus, the absence of a legal requirement for a hearing was not 
discussed. 82 
In In re Recovery I,83 the First Circuit used Marine Shale as 
authority for allowing an environmental group to appeal a settle­
ment agreement84 between the City of Shreveport, DEQ, and a pri­
vate company,811 even though no statute or constitutional provision 
required a hearing.88 However, in holding that the challenged DEQ 
action was a "final decision or order," the Recovery I court, like 
the Marine Shale court, focused on the issue of finality.87 The 
court did not address the absence of a requirement for a hearing. 88 
Neither did the court mention or attempt to distinguish Carline,89 
which had been decided by a different First Circuit panel approxi­
mately ten weeks earlier.90 
Thus, under Marine Shale and its progeny, aggrieved persons 
could use section 30:2024(C) to provide standing to appeal DEQ 
76. In re Marine Shale Processors, Inc., 563 So. 2d at 278. 
77. Carline was decided in 1993, 626 So. 2d at 358, while Marine Shale was decided in 
1990. 563 So. 2d at 278. 
78. Marine Shale, 563 So. 2d at 282. 
79. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2014 (West 1989 and West Supp. 1995). See also 
Carline, 627 So. 2d at 672 (implicitly treating Marine Shale as involving a DEQ action 
where no hearing was required). 
80. Carline, 627 So. 2d at 672; see Marine Shale, 563 So. 2d at 281-82. 
81. Carline, 627 So. 2d at 672·73 n.9. 
82. Id. 
83. In re Recovery I, Inc., 622 So. 2d 272 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993), writ denied, 629 So. 
2d 383 (La. 1994), cited in American Waste, 642 So. 2d at 1263. 
84. Recovery I, 622 So. 2d at 275. 
85. Id. at 273. 
. 86. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:2025(H) (West 1989 and West Supp. 1995). See also Car­line, 627 So. 2d at 672 n.9 (implicitly treating Recovery I as involving a DEQ action where 
no hearing was required). 
87. Carline, 627 So. 2d at 672 n.9. See also Recovery I, 622 So. 2d at 275. 
88. Carline, 627 So. 2d at 672 n.9. See also Recovery I, 622 So. 2d at 275. 
89. See discussion in Recovery I, 622 So. 2d at 275. 
90. Recovery I was decided on July 2, 1993, 622 So. 2d at 272, while Carline was de­
cided on April 23, 1993. 626 So. 2d at 358. 
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actions if the actions were final.91 The cases did not limit appeals 
to situations where an initial hearing was required, but neither did 
the cases discuss the issue squarely and hold that a person could 
appeal DEQ actions even if no hearing was required.92 
Thus, two lines of cases were available when the supreme 
court heard the noted case. At stake was whether a party could 
appeal a DEQ action under section 30:2024(C) when no hearing 
was required.93 The legal issue before the court was whether the 
APA's definition of "decision or order" applied to 30:2024(C).9" 
The court held that the APA definition does not apply, but it  did 
so without relying on Marine Shale.9" 
Using "[t]he rules of statutory interpretation,"96 the court be­
gan with the proposition that courts should interpret a statute so 
as to give meaning to all of its provisions. 97 The· court also stated 
that no statute or constitutional provision requires an adjudicatory 
hearing in any DEQ action.98 Relying on its own assertion that 
DEQ hearings are always discretionary, the court reasoned that 
"the appeal provisions of Section 2024(C) would be meaningless" if 
the APA definition of "decision or order" was applied because then 
an appeal would never be authorized. 99 
In order to avoid rendering 30:2024(C) meaningless, the court 
reasoned that a definition other than that found in the AP A 
should govern the phrase "decision or order" in 30:2024(C).100 In 
resolving the noted case, the court concluded that the grant of the 
Cade II permit was a decision or order appealable under 
30:2024(C).1 0 1  The court did not, however, provide a definition of 
91. Marine Shale, 563 So. 2d at 282. 
92. Carline, 627 So. 2d at 672 n.9. 
93. American Waste, 642 So. 2d at 1264. 
94. Id. at 1260. 
95. Id. at 1265. 
96. Id. at 1264. 
97. Id. at 1265. 
98. American Waste, 642 So. 2d at 1265. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. The court also made other determinations in resolving the noted case. Proba­
bly the most important to future cases is the court's silence in the face of American Waste's 
argument that WOW lacked standing because WOW had failed to exhaust its administra­
tive remedies. Thus, the noted case suggests that a person desiring to appeal under 
30:2024(C) need not have exhausted all administrative remedies. The court's opinion men­
tions that persons with a substantial interest may intervene in DEQ determinations, Ameri­
can Waste, 642 So. 2d at 1265 (citing Louisiana Environmental Control Commission Rule 
5.l(B)), but the opinion does not indicate that WOW intervened. See id. The opinion noted 
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"decision or order" for general use with 30:2024(C).102 Thus, the 
noted case does not determine whether the matters appealable 
under 30:2024(C) will include all DEQ actions, only permit actions, 
or only some permit actions. 1 03 
Also, although the court's suggestion that all DEQ hearings 
are discretionary was central to the majority's reasoning, neither 
the majority nor the dissenters discussed the several situations 
where a DEQ hearing is required.104 Instead, the dissenting justices 
focused their objections on the absence of statutory provisions ex­
cluding application of APA definitions to 30:2024(C) and on the 
rule that the APA applies to all agencies unless explicitly ex­
cepted.10& Justice Kimball also expressed concern that appellate 
courts would find it difficult to handle appeals of cases in which no 
adjudication had occurred.106 
The noted case is significant because it could greatly expand 
the rights of private citizens to litigate environmental issues. 
Before the noted case, the best legal precedent interpreting section 
30:2024(C) was Carline, which held that a 30:2024(C) appeal was 
available only if an initial hearing was required constitutionally or 
statutorily.107 Because many DEQ actions do not require a hearing, 
citizens unable to assert a property or liberty interest were often 
wholly dependent upon the DEQ and the political process to pro­
tect their interests. Now, the noted case suggests that any person 
aggrieved by a final DEQ action may have standing to appeal 
under section 30:2024(C). 
that an attorney representing "the Episcopal School of Acadiana and other concerned citi­
zens" requested a n  adjudicatory hearing, id. at 1261, but the opinion does not indicate that 
WOW requested an adjudicatory hearing. See id. 
102. American Waste, 642 So. 2d at 1265. 
103. See id. 
104. Id. at 1266-68. For situations where DEQ must hold a hearing, see supra notes 
41-43 and accompanying text. 
Id. 
105. American Waste, 642 So. 2d at 1267-68. 
106. Id. Dissenting in the noted case, Justice Kimball explained, 
A cursory review of the 'record' in this case reveals the difficulty of a reviewing court 
in either forum having before it entire agency files containing self serving letters, 
opinions without opportunity for cross examination, handwritten notes from meet­
ings, newspaper articles, affidavits and assertions of facts from attorneys and others 
and various other types of 'evidence.' 
107. Carline, 626 So. 2d at 363. Although Marine Shale and its progeny did not im· 
pose that limit, those cases had less value as precedent because they only addressed finality. 
Carline, 627 So. 2d at 672 n.9. 
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However, even if one welcomes an expanded right to challenge 
DEQ actions, the court's decision is problematic for several rea­
sons. First, at least of academic interest, the court's reasoning was 
flawed. Second, the court did not define the new boundaries for the 
expanded right to appeal DEQ decisions. Finally, the decision will 
require the First Circuit to hear appeals in cases where no adjudi­
cative record is available because no adjudication has occurred. 
As mentioned earlier, the supreme court's reasoning was 
flawed. The court justified its holding on the rationale that the 
AP A definition of "decision or order" would render section 
30:2024(C) meaningless because adjudicatory hearings are always 
at the DEQ's discretion.108 The Court overlooked, however, several 
situations where a statute or constitutional provision does require 
DEQ to hold an adjudicatory hearing.109 By the APA's own terms, 
the APA applies to 30:2024(C). Further, the legislature's effort to 
exclude specific portions of the AP A from application to 
30:2024(C)110 suggests a legislative understanding that other APA 
provisions do apply to 30:2024(C). Thus, the supreme court's ra­
tionale in the noted case seems less satisfactory than that of the 
First Circuit in Carline, where the court held that APA definitions 
do apply to 30:2024(C).111 
The second problem with the noted case is the supreme 
court's failure to provide a definition of "decision or order" for use 
with 30:2024(C), thereby leaving the boundaries of the expanded 
right to appeal undefined. Uncertain boundaries of the new right 
will likely lead to wasteful litigation by parties whose cases fall 
outside the undefined boundaries.112 Other persons may forego 
valid rights to appeal because they erroneously surmise that their 
cases fall beyond the unknown boundaries. 
The final problem with the result in American Waste is that 
the First Circuit will be asked to hear appeals in cases where no 
108. American Waste, 642 So. 2d at 1265. 
109. For situations where DEQ must hold a hearing, see supra notes 41-43 and accom­
panying text. 
110. Sections 49:962 and 49:964 of the AP A do not apply to DEQ decisions or orders. 
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:2024(C) (West 1989 and Supp. 1994). 
111. Carline, 626 So. 2d at 362-63. 
112. In Carline, the First Circuit stated that if a generic interpretation of "decision or 
order" replaced the APA definition that "chaos" would result. 627 So. 2d at 672. The court 
suggested that persons dissatisfied with trivial DEQ office decisions could appeal under 
30:2024(C). Id. The supreme court might not approve such a result, but the noted case 
offered scant guidance as to just what DEQ actions will be appealable. 
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adjudicatory record is available because no trial or hearing has 
been held. Thus, the First Circuit will be asked to review cases in 
which it is difficult to apply typical judicial or appellate standards. 
In short, the noted case was poorly reasoned and will likely cause 
problems in the administration of Louisiana's courts and environ­
mental laws. Because the decision turns on statutory interpretation 
and creates significant problems, the legislature can and should ad­
dress this issue. 
As a first step, the legislature should explicitly provide that 
the AP A definition of "decision or order" applies to section 
30:2024(C). Beyond that, at least two basic options are available. If 
the legislature believes the better public policy is to limit appeals 
of DEQ actions, then the legislature should stop after the first 
step. The result would restrict appeals to situations where an ini­
tial hearing was required by statute or constitution and would 
eliminate the problems associated with allowing appeals without a 
prior adjudication. 
On the other hand, if the legislature wishes to give citizens a 
greater right to challenge DEQ actions, lawmakers should take a 
second step by providing citizens with a well-defined right to de­
mand an adjudicative hearing from the DEQ. The result would 
give citizens an expanded right to litigate environmental issues, 
while eliminating the problems and uncertainties stemming from 
the noted case. 
Keith B. Hall 
